Of Sandstorms and Nuclear Tests
Henryk Szadziewski, Manager, Uyghur Human Rights Project
The Uyghurs in Kashgar are used to sandstorms. The city’s location in an oasis on the edge of a vast desert makes it a reality of life there. When the wind picks up far out to the north and east and arrives in Kashgar with a thump, Taklamakan sand squeezes through windows and scatters all over the homes of the city’s residents. As a young English language teacher at Kashgar Teachers College, sandstorms were as far as anyone could get from rain sodden England, where I grew up; however, in the time I had lived in the city, I got used to sweeping up small piles of sand in my apartment.
On one occasion, I woke in the morning to a particularly fierce sandstorm. I could hear the repeated slamming of unlocked doors and the whooshing sound made by the poplar trees when the wind surged through them. As I looked out of the window, the only sign of human life was the Kyrgyz yoghurt seller battling to stay upright as she was buffeted by strong blasts of air racing between the apartment blocks that housed the college’s staff. As the morning went on, and I prepared for my afternoon class, the wind never relented. The natural light became poorer and poorer to the extent that I had to put on a lamp to be able to see what I was doing.
With no indication that classes were cancelled, I set off in the afternoon to teach. This particular class had been difficult to manage; half of the students were Uyghur and the other half Han Chinese, and they regularly bickered over their many differences. When I arrived at the classroom, only a handful of students were present. I asked about the weather saying that it seemed especially severe. There was silence. One of the Uyghur students spoke up and said, “This is what happens after the Chinese government has tested a nuclear weapon.” Now it was my time to be silent. A Han Chinese student chastised the Uyghur in Mandarin with, “Don’t tell him that! He’s a foreigner.” Another Han Chinese student told me in English that the unusual weather was just a sandstorm and nothing more. I taught the rest of the class under an atmosphere of tension and then went back home like everyone else. In the repressive political environment of Kashgar, nothing more needed to be said.
On February 29, 2012, the World Uyghur Congress, a host of MEPs, the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization and the Belgian Uyghur Association will convene a conference on the devastating effects of China’s nuclear testing at Lop Nur. The conference, ’50 Years After Test 596: China’s Nuclear Programme in East Turkestan and Its Impact Today’, presents a range of experts to testify on an issue that has unjustly received scant attention and been contained by the silence I experienced in Kashgar. One of the experts is Uyghur doctor Enver Tohti, who at great personal risk helped to raise awareness of the issue’s urgency in the documentary Death on the Silk Road.
Between 1964 and 1996, the People’s Republic of China conducted 46 nuclear tests in East Turkestan, the homeland of millions of Uyghurs. These were the largest series of nuclear tests in the world ever to be conducted in an inhabited area. Some of the bombs were 300 times more powerful than the one exploded in Hiroshima.
23 of the tests conducted by the government of the People’s Republic of China were atmospheric, with nuclear fall out reaching as far as Europe. In addition, research indicates that radiation from the 23 tests conducted underground has reached countries as far away as Japan.
The effect the 46 tests have had on the Uyghur people and their land remains largely undocumented. What is known is that rates of cancer in the region are higher than in the rest of China and cases of leukemia, malignant lymphoma and lung cancer are all elevated. Approximately 8 out of 10 children in the villages near to the four nuclear testing sites at Lop Nur are born with cleft palates, and congenital deformities such as enlarged stomachs are common. Besides the tragic human consequences, environmental concerns over contamination of water, air and land in inhabited areas loom large. Compounding the state of affairs are allegations by former Soviet scientist Ken Alibek that a grave accident occurred at a biological weapons plant near Lop Nur in the 1980s.
In the face of contrary evidence, the Chinese government has denied the existence of far-reaching and ill effects arising from its 46 nuclear tests at Lop Nur. It has routinely denied access to independent researchers investigating the effects of the tests, while at the same time suppressing any internal documents that point to the existence of a human and environmental tragedy. The conference in Brussels is a huge step in ending the silence.
Invitation to Pan Guang
Amy Reger, Researcher, Uyghur Human Rights Project
It is not often that those involved in the Uyghur human rights movement have the chance to speak directly, in any forum, with members of Chinese officialdom (or quasi-officialdom). read more…
 A new report, “Offers They Can’t Refuse: China’s Relations with the Muslim World”, examines the Chinese government’s relationships with the governments of predominantly Muslim countries, and how these relationships have muted the Muslim world’s response to China’s repression of the Uyghur people. Written by Uyghur Human Rights Project intern Jessica Smith[1], the 24-page report provides insight into the factors motivating Muslim countries to preserve and enhance strong ties to China while remaining silent about human rights abuses that have intensified in the wake of July 5, 2009 unrest in East Turkestan. In light of China’s recent intensified push to expand trade and diplomatic links with Muslim countries on its borders and beyond, it is particularly important to explore the context behind Sino-Muslim partnerships, which appear likely to grow even further in the foreseeable future.The report, “Offers They Can’t Refuse: China’s Relations with the Muslim World”, can be downloaded at http://docs.uyghuramerican.org/Offers-They-Cant-Refuse.pdf_____________
[1] To protect the privacy of the intern, they have used a pseudonym to publish this report. The views expressed in the report are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the Uyghur Human Rights Project. |
Amy Reger, Researcher, Uyghur Human Rights Project
According to Chinese and Western media reports, the world’s largest private-sector coal company, the St. Louis-based Peabody Energy, inked a massive deal with the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region government and the Communist Party of Xinjiang on July 14 to develop a coal surface mine that is expected to produce 50 million tons of coal per year. The mine will be one of the largest coal surface mines in China, and the Wall Street Journal estimates that it will generate billions of dollars in output every year. According to Peabody Energy, an exact location has yet to be selected for the mine.
Pictures on Peabody Energy’s website reveal smiling Peabody executives shaking hands with Chinese officials while clinching this and other deals. A picture of the signing ceremony, which took place in the regional capital of Urumchi, reveals the presence of Xinjiang Governor Nur Bekri, who heralded the agreement thus:
“The Communist Party of China Xinjiang Regional Committee and the Xinjiang People’s Government will fully support Peabody’s development in Xinjiang so as to start the cooperation program at an early date, which we believe will generate the best possible returns for both sides.”
The project sidesteps usual restrictions that require foreign companies to develop coal mines by investing in or cooperating with state-owned companies. One can only speculate that the combination of immense profits for both sides, the insatiable thirst of China’s east coast for energy, and China’s newly intensified development plans for East Turkestan aligned to grease the wheels of this agreement. Such development threatens the already extremely fragile ecological balance in the region, after decades of nuclear tests and massive population increases.
Peabody’s deal follows the visit of a 20-member delegation from the China Investment Promotion Agency (CIPA) to St. Louis in June. The delegation met with the mayor of St. Louis and a Missouri senator, who sought to strengthen economic ties with Chinese business leaders and provide a market for Midwestern goods in China.
In addition, Peabody Energy’s announcement follows the June U.S. visit of Xinjiang Communist Party chief Zhang Chunxian, as discussed in UHRP’s most recent blog post. Together with Nur Bekri, Zhang has presided over one of the most repressive periods in East Turkestan’s history, during which Uyghur webmasters have been sentenced to lengthy prison terms and death sentences have been handed down after non-transparent trials.
There has been a surge in energy, transportation, and infrastructure projects in the wake of the “Xinjiang Work Forum” that took place in May 2010, which outlined large-scale development plans, funded by tens of billions of U.S. dollars in aid. Development in these areas is carried out by government officials in the absence of consultation with grassroots stakeholders. The Xinjiang Work Forum and subsequent development initiatives have been carried out in large part in response to deadly unrest that took place in Urumchi on July 5, 2009. The acceleration in development has in turn heightened Chinese authorities’ perception that stability must be maintained in the region at all costs.
Chinese officials have acknowledged that a lack of employment opportunities was among the underlying factors behind the unrest in Urumchi. However, the benefits of development in East Turkestan have traditionally manifested themselves unequally among Han Chinese, Uyghurs and other ethnicities. Prior to the new push in development mandated by the Work Forum, employment rates for ethnic Han in Xinjiang were already much higher than those for Uyghurs and other minorities, and without the implementation of policies to address discrimination in regional commercial and government sectors, Uyghurs are likely to experience fewer benefits from official development programs than their Han counterparts.
According to a May 2011 press release, Peabody Energy has been honored for its corporate and social responsibility. However, the company has also been subject to criticism from Native American and environmental groups for its corporate practices. There have been concerns that Peabody Energy projects in Arizona, for instance, are threatening the health of Native Americans. Native American and conservation groups have filed a lawsuit that seeks a release of public records regarding Peabody Energy’s mining operations in Arizona.
A researcher from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences stated that “the project will also bring many employment opportunities for local people”. However, UHRP has documented widespread systematic ethnic and gender discrimination in the recruitment process for state jobs in East Turkestan, and there is no evidence to suggest that hiring practices in the private sector are any better. In addition, there is no evidence to suggest that policies have been put in place together with the new development push in East Turkestan to address existing inequalities in hiring practices.
Peabody Energy’s new coal mine will also be developed at a time when Uyghurs and other non-Han peoples in East Turkestan are being forcibly relocated by government authorities. Tens of thousands of rural Uyghurs have been resettled in Kashgar Prefecture in the name of development and “earthquake safety”. Ethnic Mongolians in the region are also being resettled to urban areas in the name of a “herdsmen’s relocation and settlement program”.
Peabody Energy’s deal follows a June 2011 article about UK-based consultancy Buro-Happold, which has completed the infrastructure and environmental engineering planning for Beitun, a “vast new city” in East Turkestan. While a senior partner for the firm explained in the journal Building.co.uk that “there are parts of Africa where you wouldn’t feel comfortable” due to moral concerns of working there, he apparently feels no qualms about doing business in a region where the death penalty continues to be handed down to political prisoners. The firm’s chief executive, Paul Westbury, spoke highly of the efficiency of autocratic governments, saying, “If you want to get something done in China [or] Saudi Arabia, they get it done. I mean, holy cow, this stuff moves like the wind and that is bloody refreshing.”
Westbury had this to say about the relative accomplishments and morals of China and the Western world:
“The Chinese government has brought 400 million people out of poverty in the last 10 years,” he says. “The Western world has brought 1 million people out of poverty in the last 10 years. The Chinese government do some things that we regard as not right for modern society, but go back 50 to 100 years in British society and we were doing much worse.”
According to Buro-Happold’s website, the Beitun project will increase the population of the current town from 30,000 to half a million over a period of 20 years, and the new city is designed to replace the current capital of the prefecture, Altay, which is in the northern part of East Turkestan. “Located west of the town, the new city will serve as the north western gateway to China, providing a new industrial centre that will facilitate the extraction of the local mineral resources.” It is unclear what the political motivations are by moving the capital from Altay to Beitun.
Senior partner Mike Cook dismissed the prospect that Buro-Happold might be unwittingly drawn into a development program aimed at helping create “ethnic unity” in the region.
Ethnic Kazakhs constitute somewhere around half of the population of Altay Prefecture. There have been concerns that development programs in the area have displaced ethnic Kazakhs and Tuvans. According to one report, “locals say that Chinese officials have frequently ordered nomads to move to other areas, in order to make way for hotels, restaurants and other tourist infrastructure.” In May 2011, the Xinjiang Provincial Public Security Department reported that Altay Prefecture was holding its 29th “ethnic unity education month”, which would be used to carry out “ethnic unity” work and to build a “harmonious relationship, with Xinjiang characteristics, between the police and the people”.
It is unclear where the approximately 270,000 residents of the new city of Beitun are coming from. This development raises concerns of both Han in-migration to East Turkestan, which has exacerbated ethnic tensions, and environmental sustainability, in light of burgeoning development and an increase in population. Geographer Stanley Toops has written extensively on the effects of politicized development on water resources in the region. In Xinjiang: China’s Muslim Borderland, he warns of the ecological effects of development, including severe water shortages, that are beginning to occur in the absence of measures to control population. Toops highlights the environmental degradation that has taken place in Kazakh areas as a result of government policies.
New York Times blogger Andrew Revkin cited concerns about the environmental effects of Peabody Energy’s new coal mining deal, pointing out the danger in increased carbon dioxide emissions and the effects of coal production on climate change. Revkin’s blog notes that the deal was announced as China continues to expand its use of coal, despite the country’s attempts to portray itself as “green” because of its wind turbine and solar panel manufacturing.
A Chinese researcher also expressed concerns about coal production in light of the new Peabody Energy deal. Jiang Kejun, an official with the Energy Research Institute of the National Development and Reform Commission, said that more attention should be paid to clean and renewable energy resources, which are abundant in the region. He noted that costs of transporting coal to other parts of China, where demand is greater, are high. In addition, he asserted that China’s coal demand would peak in less than a decade, meaning that coal companies will have to work harder to find customers in the face of weakening demand.
If the executives of international companies such as Peabody Energy and Buro-Happold are interested in ensuring that their business initiatives in East Turkestan adhere to best practices and international human rights norms, they may refer to a United Nations document issued in 2003 entitled “Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights“. The document outlines corporations’ responsibilities to abide by such international instruments as the Convention Against Torture, the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The document specifically calls on business enterprises to ensure the respect of “indigenous peoples and other vulnerable groups”.
As regional officials in East Turkestan seek to attract more foreign investment and development in the region, it is highly likely that similar deals will be forged in energy exploitation and municipal planning projects. According to official Chinese statistics, foreign direct investment in the region tripled in the 2006-2010 period over the previous five-year period, and this amount can be expected to increase following enormous central government investment in the region and development plans mandated by the Xinjiang Work Forum.
In light of the speed and scale with which development is taking place in East Turkestan, there is a real need for oversight into business developments and the awarding of contracts. However, foreign companies are not likely to face accountability in China for the environmental impacts of their business ventures or the effects they have on indigenous populations. For the foreseeable future, it appears that both Chinese officials and Western companies will reap sizeable benefits from development initiatives in East Turkestan. Much less clear is how Uyghurs and other “ethnic minorities” will benefit from such initiatives, when they lack a voice in the development process.
Summer Travels
Henryk Szadziewski, Manager, Uyghur Human Rights Project
In an age when you are liable to be charged for the smallest service on an airline, carrying excess baggage around seems like a burden that should be best avoided. All the same, the weight of human abuses that leaders in some of the most authoritarian states on the globe take with them doesn’t seem to be too much of a problem when planning their travels. read more…
Introduction: In the past two decades, and with increasing intensity since 2002, China has pursued assimilationist policies aimed at eliminating Uyghur as a language of instruction in East Turkestan. Employing the term “bilingual†education, the Chinese government is, in reality, implementing a monolingual Chinese language education system that undermines the linguistic basis of Uyghur culture.
Under the policy, school mergers have resulted in greatly reduced availability of Uyghur language education. This process began in 2004 with the announced merger of 50 Uyghur and Chinese language schools and the directive that in these schools “teaching should be conducted in Chinese language as much as possibleâ€. As a result, Uyghur schools are being merged out of existence all over East Turkestan.
The following is an impassioned personal take by Zubayra Shamseden, a Uyghur native of Ghulja, upon learning that her alma mater, Ghulja city No. 2 High School, would be merged with a Chinese high school:
My beloved school’s name will be wiped out from East Turkestan history
Zubayra Shamseden, International Uyghur Human Rights and Democracy Foundation
I felt terrible when I heard the news that the Ghulja city No. 2 High School would be amalgamated with a Chinese school – Ghulja No. 6 High School. The amalgamation means that one of the historic milestones of Uyghur education will be wiped from East Turkestan history in this high tech, education-oriented century. As a former student of the school, it is very difficult for me to imagine that when I visit East Turkestan one day, I won’t be able to see any trace of my beloved school in my home town – Ghulja city. The school has over 100 years of history and embodies the great legacy of Uyghur education. Since its establishment, although it faced many challenges and obstacles (especially since the beginning of Chinese communist rule), it still produced countless influential figures in the areas of politics, academia, governance and other areas. It is not difficult to find living examples of all the success of Uyghur education in East Turkestan as well as abroad. As a former student of the school, I still remember the wonderful classrooms, friends, class discussions, and great teachers’ insightful teachings that shaped my life’s destiny and my views about the world. To me, losing such a great source of inspiration for my people is similar to losing my own brother and sisters on the battlefield. It hurts and leaves unforgettable scars in my heart.
What sort of paranoid mentality does the Chinese government have? Why do you have to diminish a source of great education that in fact even brings benefit to your ‘occupation’? One of the loyal governors in your ‘Xinjiang’ government, Mr. Ablet Abdirishit- isn’t he the product of that school as well? Mahinur Kasim – one of the great actors in the establishment of your communist ‘Xinjiang government’ in East Turkestan- isn’t she also the product of that school?
What is behind the so- called ‘bilingual education’ slogan?
How is the implementation of ‘bilingual education’ policies related to the destruction of an historic school and its removal from school lists? Hasn’t Ghulja No. 2 High School adhered to the rules of education? Isn’t the school fulfilling the duties of giving knowledge to all human beings? In fact, the school was doing a great job, but the Chinese government didn’t want this to continue. The government didn’t want Uyghurs to obtain an education in a way that is suitable to the Uyghur character and makes Uyghurs successful. Chinese authorities wish to educate people who look like Uyghurs, but who are actually brainwashed followers of their Chinese communist masters. From what has happened to my school and what’s happening to Uyghur education within East Turkestan right now, the truth of implementing ‘bilingual education’ means the formalized, systematic assimilation of Uyghurs to make them Han Chinese.
Wikileaks and the Uyghur
Henryk Szadziewski, Manager, Uyghur Human Rights Project
If it were ever in doubt, information obtained by the whistleblower website, Wikileaks, has confirmed Chinese government fears over its continued control of the region it calls Xinjiang, which is also known as East Turkestan. The leaked cables from U.S. diplomats demonstrate the extent to which Chinese authorities attempt to convince governments worldwide to adopt its stance on issues affecting Uyghurs. The cables also show the United States’ concerns and views regarding the on going repressive measures in the region.
Most illuminating of Chinese government pressure are the cables pointing to Chinese anger, or the specter of Chinese ire, over the release of Uyghur detainees in Guantánamo to third countries. A December 29, 2008 cable relates how Chinese Assistant Foreign Minister Liu Jieyi met with the U.S. Ambassador to China to voice Beijing’s strong opposition of release to any country other than China, and that if the U.S. did indeed accede to this request it would “avoid harm to bilateral relations and to cooperation ‘in important areas’”. Furthermore, a February 2009 cable describes how the Chinese Ambassador to Kyrgyzstan, Zhang Yannian, regarded the possible release of Uyghur Guantánamo detainees as “an unfriendly act toward us” and a “slap in the face”. That the U.S. government stood firm in not releasing the detainees to China illustrates the extent of the politicized nature of the Chinese judicial system. Legitimate concerns over terrorism are understandable, but in the U.S. government’s view the detainees would most likely face torture and execution if they returned to China
Chinese government pressure in regard to the Uyghur Guantánamo detainees was not only applied to the U.S. government, but also to New Zealand and a handful of European governments that were considering resettlement. Albania, Germany and Finland, as well as European Union member states all appear to have borne the brunt of Chinese government unhappiness. In the case of Germany, which was initially willing to consider two Uyghurs on purely humanitarian grounds, Uyghur Guantánamo cases were less preferable to other detainees because of the negative effects accepting Uyghurs would have on relations with China. A May 8, 2009 cable relates how “German Ambassador Michael Schaefer reported that Germany had informed China of the U.S. request to accept some Uighur detainees held at Guantánamo and had been subsequently warned by China of ‘a heavy burden on bilateral relations’ if Germany were to accept any detainees”.
The diplomatic cables also discuss the unrest in Urumchi, the regional capital, in July 2009. A July 13, 2009 cable discussing mass incidents in China states:
“Ethnic riots like those in Xinjiang July 5-7 and in Tibet in March of 2008 differ markedly in origin and nature from mass incidents, XXXXXXXXXXXX emphasized to PolOff [Political Officer] on XXXXXXXXXXXX. Both present serious problems for the Party, XXXXXXXXXXXX said, but the Party leadership would not hesitate to open fire on Uighurs or Tibetans if they deemed it necessary to restore order. Mass incidents pose a different kind of threat, he said, as the leadership is ‘afraid’ to fire on Han rioters for fear of sparking massive public outrage that would turn against the Party.”
This is a chilling opinion, especially when one considers the evidence presented in two reports released this year by the Uyghur Human Rights Project (UHRP) and Amnesty International that detail eyewitness accounts of the use of deadly live fire against Uyghur protestors in July 2009. In addition, the observation that fire would not be deployed against Han Chinese protestors has resonances for the different approach taken by Chinese security forces in Urumchi to Han Chinese protests in September 2009. During those protests, then Party Secretary, Wang Lequan, addressed demonstrators, who had demanded that he let them know about government responses to security concerns. A similar request to meet with the Party Secretary by Uyghur demonstrators in July was not met.
The wider repercussions of the unrest also saw a brief discussion on the effect it would have on Iran-China relations, and on relations with Australia after World Uyghur Congress President, Ms. Rebiya Kadeer, spoke at the National Press Club in Canberra in August 2009. In the latter case, the Chinese government “privately warn[ed] a major Australian bank that sponsors the National Press Club to use its influence to block a Kadeer speech there”.
The United States’ concerns about the situation in the Uyghur region also come through in the cables. In a discussion on policy direction in Tibet, U.S. officials explain that it will be impossible for Chinese leaders to adopt a softer line “if they look like they are doing so under international pressure”. The cable dated April 16, 2008, one month after the outbreak of unrest in Tibetan regions, also relayed the observation “that domestic stability remains the leadership’s top priority above all else, meaning there will ‘almost surely’ be no relaxation of the current hard line on Tibet or in places like Xinjiang.” The information contained in the cable also sheds light on the extreme sensitivity with which the Chinese government views territorial integrity, and the possible spill over of unrest from Tibet.
The prospect of solutions to tensions in Tibet and Xinjiang arising from civil society are debated in a February 24, 2008 cable. While suggesting that China’s economic success will increase its resistance to democratic reform, the cable also discusses how Chinese leaders see the usefulness of “a limited expansion of civil society, including improvements in the rule of law and a stronger role for approved religions, NGOs, charities and other actors in areas that contribute to social stability and do not challenge Communist Party rule.” This is a notable change in thinking, which has seen U.S. officials promote the notion that Chinese economic development, and economic relations with China will bring about a progressively democratic society; however, more faith appears to be placed in a grassroots movement than one that begins from the top levels of the Chinese government. Nevertheless, the cable concludes that “[i]n areas such as Tibet and Xinjiang, the fear of separatism leads to tighter restrictions on the growth of civil society.” This approach is viewed as counter-productive by the official, who suggests that the U.S. government “should continue to express…serious concerns over Beijing’s human rights record and appeal to China’s growing awareness that greater respect for human rights, religious freedom and the rule of law will serve to promote the very development and social stability that China seeks as well as to improve China’s international image.” Such a strategy would take considerable diplomatic skills considering “China’s paranoid fear that the United States secretly promotes regime change and ‘separatists’ in Taiwan, Tibet and Xinjiang”.
The cables offer insight into the daily business of diplomacy that is rarely afforded to the general public, and it is interesting to note the amount of work done behind closed doors on Uyghur issues. The importance of the role of the United States as a monitor of Uyghur human rights conditions in private conversations is made clear, and contrasts with its tactful public stance. The staff of the Uyghur Human Rights Project is well aware of the pressure the Chinese government exerts on Uyghur activists; still, the details of Chinese government pressure on its counterparts is illustrative of the degree that Chinese officials attempt to suppress contradictory narratives. With more revelations to come from Wikileaks, concerns over Uyghurs may not grab the headlines, but the cables have shed new light on the documentation of human rights conditions in the Uyghur region.
A Visit to Tongxin Middle School
Uyghur third-graders in Urumchi study in Chinese. @China News Service 2009
Amy Reger, Researcher, Uyghur Human Rights Project
In a recent article published by Phoenix New Media, reporter Qi Rui describes a visitto TongxinMiddleSchool, a schoolcomprised of Uyghur, Kyrgyz, Kazakh and Hui students located in an impoverished area of East Turkestan’s Kizilsu Kirghiz Autonomous Prefecture.[1] Qi’s visitis part of an exploration into the importance of promoting “bilingual education” and reducing poverty in the western-most sliver of Chinese territory. While the reduction of poverty is a praiseworthy endeavor, the tone of the article displays the patronizing approach that typifies official Chinese attitudes towards ethnic minorities who, in their view, should be grateful for the development bestowed upon them by the dominant culture. The “bilingual education” touted in the article, which is currently being promoted throughout East Turkestan, belies the true nature of a campaign to phase out the Uyghur language and other “ethnic minority” languages from all levels of instruction and replace them with Mandarin Chinese. Absent from Qi’s commentary is recognition of any value of preserving and promoting the Uyghur or Kyrgyz languages among the region’s schoolchildren, or in teaching these languages to non-native speakers.
Uyghur parents and former students from East Turkestan have told the Uyghur Human Rights Project (UHRP) that they recognize the need to learn Chinese in order to survive in a Chinese language-dominated society, but they lament the fact that parents are no longer given a choice regarding whether or not their children will study in the Uyghur language in school.
A report issued by the organization “Save the Children”, which carries out educational work in East Turkestan, stated:
Fully aware that good Mandarin is required for employment; parents from ethnic minority communities are now enrolling their children in Han schoolswhere the standard of Mandarin is considered to be better.
However, the report also notes that the organization was precluded from “implementing a bilingual programme that promotes the full development of mother tongue languages”, even in preschools.
Essentially, it seems Uyghur parents and students must balance a desire for cultural survival with economic and social realities- and even this stark choice is increasingly being taken out of parents’ hands.
Qi observes in his article that TongxinMiddleSchool’s facilities are almost the same as those of schoolsin eastern China, except for that “in every classroom, next to the teacher’s podium there is a poster proclaiming an “ethnic unity” pledge, with the second line stating that “every teacher and student should, in thinking and behavior, be fully conscious that the biggest danger to Xinjiang derives from “ethnic splittism” and “illegal religious activities”.
The ubiquitous pledge, doubtless present at many other schoolsin East Turkestan, makes clear to TongxinMiddleSchool’s young students that their responsibility to learn Chinese is tinged with political urgency. It is made clear to them the importance of assuming a Chinese identity, and learning Mandarin Chinese, lest their lack of Chinese language knowledge make them vulnerable to “ethnic splittists”. In 2009, regional chairman Nur Bekri even implied that those Uyghurs who only speak their mother tongue are inherently terrorist suspects, stating “that “[t]errorists from neighboring countries mainly target Uygurs [Uyghurs] that are relatively isolated from mainstream society as they cannot speak Mandarin. They are then tricked into terrorist activities”.
At the “Xinjiang Work Forum” that took place in May 2010, government cadres pledged to ensure that all students in the region would be able to speak Mandarin by the year 2020. In October, the regional government published a document outlining a ten-year plan toward reaching this goal. Qi states that bilingual education, already underway in Akqi County, where TongxinMiddleSchoolis located, will have a positive effect in terms of increasing employment opportunities and ensuring “social stability”.
“Bilingual education”, which is a policy of compulsory Mandarin language education, was first implemented in experimental classes at middleschoolsin 1999. The policy was then expanded over the course of the next several years, with Uyghur schoolsbeing merged out of existence region-wide beginning in 2004, at which time the rate at which “bilingual” education was eliminating Uyghur from East Turkestan’s schoolsincreased dramatically.
In 1997, “Xinjiang classes” were established, in which Uyghur and other “ethnic minority” students are sent to high schoolsin large cities in eastern China, where they receive Chinese-language instruction as well as immersion in Chinese culture. In 2005, former Xinjiang Party Secretary Wang Lequan described the program in terms of its political importance, stating that “political thought training”, and not academic preparation, was its chief goal. According to official media reports, 22,000 students were reportedly enrolled in Chinese-language high schoolsin eastern China in fall 2010, marking an increase of 2,000 over the previous year.
Last month, Tibetans in Qinghai and Beijing protested over an official plan to change the language of instruction for Tibetan students. Thousands of students in Qinghai and hundreds of Tibetan university students in Beijing peacefully demonstrated, expressing concern over the official plan, which aims to replace Tibetan with Chinese in textbooks. Tibetans, like Uyghurs, fear that the downgrading of their mother tongue in education represents an attack on their identity and culture.
Language policy in Tibetan areas has also been heavily politicized. The International Campaign for Tibet (ICT) cited Qinghai Party Secretary Qiang Wei as stating that strengthening “bilingual education” is “an important political duty.”
As news of the Tibetan protests spread throughout China, Uyghur students and teachers expressed solidarity with Tibetan demonstrators. A teacher interviewed by Radio Free Asia about the Tibetan protests said:
“Every Uyghur teacher and student is supporting Tibet right now, because we have the same problems here,” she said. “We should be using our own language, and our students need to be learning about our culture so that we can stay Uyghurs,” she said.
The teacher stated that government officials never asked the local Uyghur community what they thought about the “bilingual education” policy, and that enforcing the use of Mandarin Chinese in Uyghur schoolshas had a detrimental effect on the education system in East Turkestan, causing teachers to lose their jobs and students to lose interest in their classes.
“The local government is doing everything wrong. The government should not be enforcing a bilingual policy, especially on the young Uyghur children in kindergarten.”
The parents of Uyghur children were previously given a choice regarding whether to send their children to Uyghur-language or Chinese-language schools. Students who graduated from the former are often referred to as minkaomin, or ethnic-study-ethnic, while students graduating from the latter are known as minkaohan, or ethnic-study-Chinese. Minkaohan students have described feeling alienated from both Uyghur and Chinese cultures, and from minkaomin. Today, students are increasingly becoming alienated from their own parents, who often cannot help their children with their homework, or even fully communicate with them.
Save the Children noted in its report that one of the most effective ways of teaching children their mother tongue and a second language is by first building a foundation in children’s mother tongue, and then teaching them the second language. However, the organization stated, educational trends in East Turkestan are making this increasingly difficult for ethnic minority children. A Mandarin-only education policy is increasingly being implemented in kindergartens and even pre-schoolsthroughout East Turkestan.
Back in TongxinMiddleSchool, where students are given 220 yuan per month for living expenses and have access to a library boasting 50,000 books, there is an obvious equation of development with Chinese language and culture, and of backwardness with one’s native language. The Chinese language is promoted as a civilizing influence that will bring prosperity to the students, while it is implied that Uyghur, Kyrgyz and Kazakh have no value in the modernizing world.
Based on conversations with the school’s principal, reporter Qi states that the schoolacts as a civilizing force for the students, as many of them come from rural families who, prior to attending the school, did not often brush their teeth, and may even never have seen a glass door.
“Therefore, the teachers at TongxinMiddleSchoolhave to regularly arrange for the students to take showers, and teach them how to use a toilet,” states Qi.
Qi dismisses existing domestic guarantees regarding the right of minorities to be educated in their mother tongue, stating “these policies led many Uyghur students to fail to master the Chinese language, affecting their employment prospects and their interactions with other ethnic groups.” Qi further argues that the policies are inconsistent with Western norms of “equal opportunity” for all ethnicities, in that they provide an unfair advantage for ethnic minorities. Qi highlights several government policies toward ethnic minorities, such as the policy allowing ethnic minorities to have more than one child, as examples of what he views as “unequal” treatment of minority groups vs. Han Chinese.
Qi makes much of the need for Uyghurs and other ethnic minority students to learn Chinese in order to be able to enter the workforce, but non-Han graduates have in recent years given accounts of immense challenges in finding employment even after having mastered the Chinese language.
In September, according to ICT, hundreds of Tibetan university graduates protested a lack of available jobs. ICT documented discrimination in the government sector in favor of ethnic Chinese graduates in recent years, and government incentives provided to ethnic Chinese graduates to work in “western or remote areas” of the PRC, which marginalizes Tibetan, Uyghur and other graduates.
UHRP has documented similar discrimination in the government and private sectors in East Turkestan. Hiring notices posted on the Internet for civil service and university jobs in East Turkestan have revealed blatant discrimination against Uyghurs and other non-Han ethnic groups, as well as against women of any ethnicity.
Uyghurs interviewed by UHRP have spoken of encountering discrimination upon entering the workforce, in spite of their academic background and fluency in the Chinese language.
A UHRP report noted the experience of one Uyghur teacher who took his Mandarin-speaking Uyghur students to a job fair: “At job fairs in schoolsI would go with my students to look for jobs but the signs will say ‘we don’t want minority people’. I felt ashamed, humiliated. My students, they study hard, but they still have no opportunities, no jobs. So I felt like I was teaching a lie.”
[1] According to the 2000 census, nearly 64% of the prefecture’s population is comprised of Uyghurs, 28% is comprised of Kyrgyz, with the rest comprised of Han, Tajiks, Hui, and other ethnic groups.